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Is the renminbi’s exchange rate an important issue for Europe? For a long time, it seemed as though 
it was not. As recently as 2006–07, when Henry Paulson, secretary of the US Treasury, was calling 
the US-China economic relationship the most important in the world and no less than three 
congressional bills envisaged potential trade retaliation against an allegedly deliberate currency 
undervaluation, Europe was surprisingly silent. It apparently had no strong views on either the 
exchange rate regime or the valuation of the renminbi.  Ministries  of  finance  and  the  European 
Central Bank (ECB) investigated the issue and discussed it in contacts with Chinese counterparts, 
but it was not prominent on policymakers’ agendas and was hardly discussed publicly. When asked, 
officials either referred to the latest Group of Seven (G-7) communiqué or replied that the issue was 
best dealt with behind closed doors in discussions between ministers or among central bankers. 
Europe was apparently relying on the implicit assumption that, to it, the issue was second order, and 
in any case, its interests coincided with those of the United States. Therefore, Europe could rely on US 
activism for all practical purposes.  
  The situation began to change only in autumn 2007 as the Eurogroup, an informal gathering 
of euro-area finance ministers, began a more in-depth discussion of the matter. On October 8, 2007 
the group issued a statement that “in emerging countries with large and growing current account 
surpluses, especially China, it is desirable that their effective exchange rates move so that 
necessary adjustments occur” and decided to initiate direct discussion with China’s leadership. At 
the end of November, Eurogroup President Jean-Claude Juncker, ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet, 
and European Commissioner Joaquín Almunia were sent to Beijing for the first direct bilateral 
consultations on monetary and exchange rates matters. The Europeans, however, remain guarded in 
expressing their views on China’s exchange rate policy.    
  Is there a rationale for this difference in attitudes between the two sides of the Atlantic? Or is 
the euro area only slower in reacting to China’s emergence as a major surplus country in the world 
economy? This is the issue I intend to investigate in this paper. To this end, I examine five potential 
explanations of transatlantic differences of view: that China does not matter that much to Europe; 
that the renminbi/US dollar exchange rate is a bilateral issue; that the alternatives are worse; that the 
Europeans have divergent interests; and that the euro area does not have an exchange rate policy. 
After examining these five potential explanations, I conclude in the last section. 
1.  First View: China Does Not Matter That Much to Europe 
 
Many observers would suggest that Europe behaves as it does because China is a much more 
important economic partner for the United States than it is for Europe. This is a widely held 
perception, probably attributable to the rather smooth development of EU-China relations. In 
contrast with the emotional, generally politicized, and sometimes tense character of US-China 
r e l a t i o n s ,  E U - C h i n a  r e l a t i o n s  h a v e  o n l y  r e c e n t l y  b e c o m e  a  m a t t e r  o f  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t  i n  E u r o p e
1. 
Previously, the international rise of China and its global economic implications had long remained 
underestimated, sometimes almost unnoticed. In the 1990s and early 2000s, political energy was 
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essentially devoted to addressing internal issues, such as the creation of the single market and the 
euro or enlargement.    
  To further illustrate the apparent neglect, in 2000, in response to the perceived challenge of 
that time—the emergence of the so-called new economy in the United States—Europe adopted a 
new economic strategy, the Lisbon agenda, which essentially ignored the various opportunities and 
challenges that China’s growth and development posed. Since then, perceptions have changed and 
initial inattention has started to be corrected, but European interest in and concern about China 
remain strikingly less intense than the US fascination with it.  
  However, this asymmetry in perceptions is not supported by numbers. In 2006, EU exports to 
China exceeded those of the United States by 45 percent and its imports from China were only 23 
percent lower than those of the US. Its trade deficit is certainly lower, but it only trails that of the 
United States by about two years (figure 1). The euro area is in a very similar situation. As a 
consequence, European policymakers have started to indicate that they could soon lose patience. As 
trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson said in November, “the number that preoccupies Europe these 
days is $20 million dollars. Because that is how fast the EU-China trade deficit is growing every single 
hour. Fast enough to catch up with the US-China trade deficit in the next year or so
2.”  
 
Figure 1: US and European Deficits in Trade with China 
 
 
  
 
The transatlantic difference does not become wider when competition in third markets is accounted 
for, such as by using Bank of International Settlements measures of effective exchange rates 
(EERs): China’s weight in the euro area’s EER is only somewhat lower that its weight in the US EER 
(figure 2). Clearly no number supports the view that the intensity of US economic relations with 
China is of a different order of magnitude than those of the European Union or euro area.   
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Figure 2: China’s Weight in Effective Exchange Rate 
 
 
2.  Second View: The Dollar-Renminbi Exchange Rate Is a Bilateral Issue 
 
The second potential explanation for Europe’s relative detachment from the renminbi issue is that 
the European currencies are in a floating exchange rate regime against the dollar. Thus, while the 
renminbi/dollar exchange rate is not market determined, the exchange rate of European currencies 
against the renminbi is indirectly market determined. This asymmetry is undisputable.  
  What the asymmetry may imply can be best understood by imagining the United States and 
China as partners in a de facto currency union. Accordingly, it should not be the US or Chinese current 
account balance that matters, but rather the aggregate US-China current account balance or that of a 
wider dollar zone, in the same way that what matters for the exchange rate of the euro is neither the 
Spanish deficit nor the German surplus, but the aggregate balance, which is close to equilibrium. The 
aggregate US-China balance, while still far from equilibrium, has improved somewhat in recent times 
and is set to improve further in 2008 (figure 3
3). Also, the bilateral trade balance of the euro area 
regarding the United States and China combined is very close to zero.  
  The trade balance figures suggest that the dollar peg of the renminbi and its undervaluation 
might result in the euro being stronger against the dollar and weaker against the renminbi than 
would be the case if the renminbi were to float, with no clear consequences in effective terms. This 
type of reasoning is consistent with the revived Bretton Woods approach of Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, 
and Garber (2003), who emphasise that emerging countries have entered a stable fixed exchange 
rate arrangement with the dollar; it may also have underpinned the view frequently held in the early 
2000s that the euro had no stake in global adjustment because it was itself close to equilibrium in 
effective terms. 
                                                 
3 Forecasts for 2007 and 2008 are from the IMF, based on the conventional assumption of stable exchange rates 
throughout the forecast period.    4
Figure 3: Current Account Balances, 1983-2008 
 
 
 
  For this view to be justified, however, the United States and China would have to form a true 
monetary union or to be expected eventually to create one. In that case, market participants could 
and actually would be wholly indifferent to the two countries’ individual balances. But because they 
do not expect the peg to last forever, they still regard each country’s intertemporal budget 
constraints as meaningful and accordingly monitor their national current accounts and net foreign 
asset positions.  
  If the US current account matters, rather than the current account of a wider aggregate 
comprising China, then it follows that a renminbi undervaluation has strong consequences for the 
euro/dollar exchange rate. For a given equilibrium exchange rate of the US currency, the more the 
renminbi is undervalued, the more the euro needs to appreciate in bilateral and effective terms. This 
type of reasoning underpins most evaluations of equilibrium exchange rates, including those of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF 2006). Such evaluations generally conclude that, although the 
effective exchange rate of the US dollar was above equilibrium in 2007, there was no need for the 
euro to appreciate further in effective terms (Ahearne et al. 2007).  
  Following this line of reasoning, the Europeans should have every interest in pushing for an 
appreciation of the renminbi because such a move would reduce the upward pressure on their own 
currency and the risk of it becoming clearly overvalued in effective terms, at significant 
macroeconomic cost. It would also reduce its required appreciation against the US dollar (Ahearne et 
al. 2007), and to the extent that the Europeans are sensitive to the dollar exchange rate because the 
United States is their direct competitor in certain industries, most notably aerospace, the latter is 
something they should be sensitive to.    
3.  Third View: The Alternatives Are Worse 
 
The third reason for Europe’s caution regarding the reform of the Chinese exchange rate regime may 
be an aversion to the risk of unintended adverse consequences. Better the devil you know than the 
devil you do not. Europeans might fear that a Chinese move toward a more flexible exchange rate 
regime would result in an appreciation of the euro as China diversifies its reserves away from US 
dollar assets and, at least partially, into European currencies. The reasoning here starts from the 
financial account rather than the current account, resulting in the opposite conclusion. Thus, there   5
seems to be an inconsistency between the so-called trade view and the so-called financial account 
view of Europe’s relationship to the renminbi issue.  
  The model of Blanchard, Giavazzi, and Sa (2005) helps to clarify the reason for the 
inconsistency, as it encompasses both views. It can be summarized in two long-term relations 
between the exchange rate (E)
4 and the external debt (F) of the United States, represented by 
current account balance (EC) and a portfolio balance (EP) schedules (figure 4). Both slope 
downward: In the steady state a higher debt implies a more devalued exchange rate, resulting in a 
larger trade surplus, which allows for servicing of the debt. Higher debt also implies that 
nonresidents hold more dollar assets, which they are inclined to do if a lower dollar makes those 
assets cheaper
5.       
  Suppose now that E represents the exchange rate of the dollar against the euro and that F 
represents the holdings of dollar assets by European residents. A Chinese move to a floating 
exchange rate regime means two things: First, an appreciation of the renminbi resulting in an 
outward shift of the EC curve, as for a given level of debt, the same US current account balance can be 
achieved with a higher bilateral euro-dollar exchange rate; and second, the removal of a marginal 
buyer of US dollar assets, which moves the EP curve inward, as for a given level of debt, the dollar 
needs to depreciate as Europeans have to hold more of it in their portfolios. In the long run, the result 
of the two moves is unambiguously an appreciation of the dollar against the euro (a move from A to A’ 
in figure 4).  
 
Figure 4: Effects of a RMB float on the euro-dollar exchange rate 
 
 
  In the short term, however, the dynamics are likely to imply a depreciation of the US dollar 
against the euro (see Blanchard, Giavazzi, and Sa 2005), as for a given level of debt and US current 
account deficit, an end to Chinese intervention implies a lower demand for dollar-denominated 
assets, which implies a further depreciation of the US currency.    
  The issue for the Europeans is therefore one of time preference. The renminbi peg on the 
dollar has the advantage of avoiding too sharp a depreciation of the US currency in the short run, but 
it also contributes to the build-up of US external debt, and thus, to an eventually lower dollar in the 
long run.       
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4.  Fourth View: The Europeans Are Divided 
 
A factor often mentioned to explain why the Europeans have difficulty defining a stance on the 
Chinese exchange rate is that they are internally divided. This is both true and unconvincing.  
  Certainly the Europeans hold different views. In autumn 2007 German Finance Minister Peer 
Steinbrück notoriously claimed “love”
6 for the strong euro at the same time that French President 
Nicolas Sarkozy was lamenting its detrimental effects on the aerospace industry. At the root of this 
divergence are strongly divergent performances in world trade, the determinants of which can be 
found in structural factors and the evolution of the real exchange rate of the participating countries 
against their partners in the euro zone since the start of the monetary union.   
  Figure 5 illustrates those diverging trends. For each of the euro-area member countries, the 
X-axis plots the deviation since 1999 of the real exchange rate from the euro area average and the Y-
axis plots the deviation of exports from the euro area average. Countries in the southeast quadrant, 
most notably Germany, have experienced real depreciation and an improvement in their relative 
export performance. Countries in the northwest quadrant, especially Italy, Portugal, and Spain, have 
experienced the opposite development. France also belongs to this category. Ireland has 
experienced both a sharp real appreciation and a structural improvement in its relative export 
performance. The extent of divergence over a rather short time span is striking. These developments 
have taken policymakers by surprise, contributing to an explanation for why national ministers have 
different views on the exchange rate of the euro.  
 
Figure 5: Real Exchange Rate and Export Performance Divergence within the Euro Area, 1999-
2006 
 
 
  
Other reasons why the Europeans react differently have to do with the wide dispersion of 
geographical and sectoral trade patterns, resulting in different sensitivity to exchange rate changes.   
  However, the Europeans are no less divided on trade matters—largely for the same 
reasons—but they nevertheless have a common trade policy that makes the European Union one of 
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the few key players in international trade negotiations. Divergence within can explain external 
paralysis only if governance mechanisms are too weak to ensure that a common stance is defined 
and implemented. After all, US states also have strongly divergent interests regarding the 
appropriate level of the exchange rate, yet the federal government can define its stance and 
communicate it. At any rate, the straightforward tone adopted in official declarations since autumn 
2007—“We want an end to a managed currency in China,” as Mandelson said that November
7—
indicates that divisions do not hamper common positions any more.   
5.  Fifth View: The Euro Area Does Not Have an Exchange Rate Policy 
 
This leads to the examination of a fifth potential factor behind the Europeans’ lack of assertiveness 
on the renminbi issue: that they do not have a proper exchange rate policy. The treaty provisions for 
exchange rate matters are notoriously complex and ambiguous, as they result from a compromise 
between German and French views (Henning 2007). The issue here is one of vertical division of labor 
between the European Union or the euro area, which logically has competence on exchange rate 
matters, and the member states, which participate individually in the G-7, Group of 20, and the IMF. It 
is also one of horizontal division of labor between the ECB and the Eurogroup, not to mention the 
European Commission. Both insiders (Bini Smaghi 2006) and observers (Ahearne and Eichengreen 
2007) have assessed those arrangements as a drag on the definition and effective expression of 
common views on international monetary and financial matters. Such arrangements certainly make 
it difficult to decide who sets the objective (the Eurogroup or the ECB?), who speaks (de facto 
everybody), and who acts (often nobody). The fact that trade policy is a EU-27 competence while 
exchange rate matters are dealt with by the 15-strong euro area, and structural reforms are primarily 
a national competence, further complicates the issue.  
  Defining a stance and a strategy on the renminbi was bound to entail entering unexplored 
territory. The arrangements for exchange rate policy enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty had been 
drafted with a view to deciding how to intervene on exchange markets, manage target zones, or enter 
into formal agreements with third countries, not anticipating the delicate issues of financial 
diplomacy raised in any dialogue with Chinese authorities. By nature, a conversation about the 
renminbi has to include both the Eurogroup, because only governments speak to governments, and 
the central bank, because of its extensive responsibility on exchange rate matters. Against the 
background of controversies about the monetary stance of the ECB, such a conversation is also 
bound to be regarded as a test of the central bank’s effective independence. All these factors may 
have contributed to delaying Europe’s response to the renminbi issue.  
  However, the communiqué of October 2007 and the decision to send a mission to Beijing 
indicate that the complexity of internal arrangements is not an insurmountable impediment to 
expressing views any more. It probably signals the end of Europe’s long-standing benign neglect 
toward the renminbi.  
6.  Conclusion 
 
There is no convincing reason for the Europeans to be more indifferent than are Americans regarding 
the Chinese exchange rate policy. Of all the possible explanations we have examined—that China 
matters less for Europe than it does for the United States, that the exchange rate of the renminbi is a 
bilateral issue, that alternatives to the dollar peg can only be worse, that the Europeans are divided, 
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and that they do not have a proper exchange rate policy—none provides a compelling motive for 
indifference.  
  What remains as a hypothesis to explain the difference between US and EU attitudes is 
probably that the Europeans are slower to react to external developments. The absence of significant 
external deficit, doubts about which policy stance is desirable, internal disagreements, an untested 
governance of exchange-rate relations, and a habit of following US leadership may have all 
contributed to a slow European response. That said, the Europeans have recently woken up to the 
issue as the euro has appreciated quickly against both the dollar and the renminbi, and they can be 
expected to adopt an increasingly active stance on China’s exchange rate policy. 
 
References 
 
Ahearne, Alan, William R. Cline, Kyung Tae Lee, Yung Chul Park, Jean Pisani-Ferry, and John 
Williamson. 2007. Global Imbalances: Time for Action. Bruegel Policy Brief 2007/02 (March). 
Brussels: Bruegel. 
 
Ahearne, Alan, and Barry Eichengreen. 2007. External Monetary and Financial Policy: A Review and a 
Proposal. In Fragmented Power: Europe and the Global Economy, ed. André Sapir. Brussels: Bruegel.   
 
Bini Smaghi, Lorenzo. 2006. Powerless Europe: Why is the Euro Area Still a Political Dwarf? 
International Finance 9, no. 2: 1–19.  
 
Blanchard, Olivier, Francesco Giavazzi, and Filippa Sa. 2005. The US Current Account and the Dollar. 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2005, no. 1: 1–66.  
 
Dooley, Michael, David Folkerts-Landau, and Peter Garber. 2003. An Essay on the Reinvented 
Bretton-Woods System. NBER Working Paper 9971 (September). Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of 
Economic Research.  
 
Henning, Randall. 2007. Organizing Foreign Exchange Intervention in the Euro Area. Journal of 
Common Market Studies 45, no. 2: 315–342. 
 
IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2006. Methodology for CGER Exchange Rate Assessments. 
Washington. Photocopy (November 8).  
 